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In 2004, over 50% of total FTSE 100 trading volume was executed in blocks of 
10,000 shares or greater; in 1984 block trades represented just 5% of total FTSE 100 
trading volume. Given the significant increase in trading volume, block trading has 
received immense attention in the financial markets literature.  The interest stems from 
the practical implications of such research, including investigations of the markets 
available to execute block trades and the roles they serve (see among others Keim and 
Madhaven, 1996 and Madhaven and Cheng, 1997); the association between blockholder 
ownership and market liquidity (Heflin and Shaw, 2000); and the determinants of the 
trading costs of block trades (see among others Keim and Madhaven, 1997 and Conrad et 
al, 2001). 
The behaviour and measurement of the price impacts connected with block trades is 
of fundamental importance to policy makers promoting market liquidity, and portfolio 
manager’s investment strategies. The components of investment strategy include the 
selection of blocks to buy or sell. Trading costs can substantially reduce the return on an 
investment. Consequently, there is considerable interest in assessing the magnitude of 
trading costs. There are two major components to trading costs: explicit costs consisting 
mainly of commission costs, and implicit costs, consisting primarily of the price impact 
of a trade.
1  Explicit costs are very difficult to minimise because they are typically 
charged at predetermined rates. Implicit costs on the other hand, can be minimised. 
Schwartz and Shapiro (1992) argue that institutional investors, who normally trade in 
                                                 
1 There are additional transactions costs, such as taxes, clearance and settlement fees. These are ignored 
because they are too small to have an impact on trading volume (Keim and Madhaven, 1997).  
  1large quantities, are concerned with the opportunity costs involved in undertaking these 
large trades. 
Gemmill (1996) discovers an asymmetry in the price effects of buyer and seller 
initiated trades on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The asymmetry indicates that 
block sellers pay a liquidity premium while buyers do not, as price reversals accompany 
block sales while price continuations follow block purchases.  
 
The block trading literature measures price impact using transaction prices. This 
implicitly assumes an equal probability of a trade at the bid or ask.  If this is not the case, 
block trade price effects will be systematically biased.  There is significant evidence that 
prices at the open and close of trade on the NYSE have a tendency to occur at the ask 
(Harris, 1989 and Porter, 1992).
2  This implies that returns measured using prices near the 
close will be upwardly biased.  The asymmetry in the price behaviour of returns 
following block and institutional trades is consistent with such biases.  
 
Frino et al (2003) analyze price effects of block trades for the 30 stocks that comprise 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average over the time period of 1993-2001. They discover that 
excluding block trade price effects of bid-ask bias eliminates the systematic differences 





                                                 
2 Aitken et al (1995) document similar evidence for the ASX. 
  2    Motivated by the discussions above, this paper re-examines the price impact of 
block trades for FTSE 100 firms over the time period 1998-2004, in order to determine 
the cause of the asymmetry between block purchases and sales. Our study contributes in 
several respects to the work of Gemmill (1996).  First, we examine the asymmetry 
between block purchases and block sales with respect to bid-ask bias. Second, our sample 
of block trades covers a time period of 7 years (1998-2004). This dataset is very large 
when compared with the dataset used by Gemmill (1996). This is reflected by the fact 
that Gemmill (1996) examines 3010 block purchases and 2977 block sales whereas; our 
dataset consists of 1.6 million block purchases and 1.2 million block sales. 
 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology used to implement the econometric analysis. Section 3 documents and 
replicates the asymmetry between block purchases and block sales found in Gemmill 
(1996).  A bid-ask spread explanation for the asymmetry between block purchases and 
sales can be found in Section 4.  The empirical results and robustness tests are provided 
in Sections 5 and 6.  Finally Section 7 concludes.   
 
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
 
This study focuses on block trades in the FTSE 100 over the time period January 1, 
1998 to January 1, 2004.  These block trades are of particular interest as they account for 
a substantial fraction (around 70%) of total LSE volume and market capitalisation.  Block 
trades are defined by the LSE as trades of 10,000 shares or greater.  The data used in this 
  3study were obtained from the LSE database. Several filters are applied to the trades and 
quotes.
3  
Trades are designated as being seller or buyer initiated using the trade direction 
algorithm developed by Ellis et al (2000), which states that if a trade occurs at the ask 
quote the trade reflects a purchase and if the trade is executed at the bid price then the 
trade is classified as seller initiated.  Transactions which execute at neither the bid or ask 
price are classified using the tick test, such that if the last price change was an uptick the 
trade is buyer initiated, and vice versa for sales.  
 
  Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the block trades analysed in this study.  
The overall sample consists of 1,613,766 block purchases, and 1,226,599 block sales. At 
first inspection, Table 1 reveals some common features of both seller and buyer initiated 
block trades. As mentioned previously, sample transactions are very large compared to 
Gemmill (1996); for the whole sample the typical block trade involves an average in 
excess of 1 million shares. Our sample of block trades is slightly dominated by buyer-
initiated blocks, and that seems to be the case for stocks with larger market capitalisation. 
Gemmill (1996) and Frino et al (2003) have pointed out the asymmetry of buy and sell 
blocks, with the latter being more frequent then purchased blocks.    
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
                                                 
3 Trades are omitted if they are indicated in the LSE database to be coded out of time sequence. Trades 
indicated to be exchange acquisitions or distributions, or that involve nonstandard settlement are also 
omitted, as are trades that are not preceded by a valid same-day quote. Quotes are omitted if either the ask 
or bid price is non-positive.  
  4Following previous literature (see among others Gemmill (1996), Keim and Madhaven 
(1996) and Madhavan and Cheng (1997)) block trade price effects are measured as 
follows:  
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Where   is the equilibrium market price prior to the block transaction, while   is the 




4.   represents the block price.  
Price effects measured using transaction prices, substitute the open and closing price for 
 and   respectively. This methodology attempts to capture the price effects of block 
trades and any information leakage as shown by Keim and Madhavan (1996) and 




3.  Price Impact Asymmetry 
Table 2 summarises the price impact of block purchases and sales.  Consistent with 
Gemmill (1996), there appears to be a significant asymmetry in the price impact of buyer 
and seller initiated trades. Reversals predicted by short run liquidity costs follow sales 
and consistent with the information hypothesis, total price effects suggest block sales 
 
4   and   are calculated with the use of a 20 day event window. This measure allows for a delay in the 
market’s speed of adjustment to the block trade. 
p P c P
  5move the price of a stock on average by –23.16 basis points.  Block purchases on the 
other hand have a total price effect of 32.66 basis points.  This demonstrates that like 
Gemmill (1996) we observe a clear asymmetry in the price behaviour of block trades on 
the LSE.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
4.  A Bid-Ask Spread Explanation  
A possible explanation for the asymmetric price behaviour between block purchases and 
sales could be trading cost biases in transaction data. Gemmill (1996) measures the price 
impact of block trades with the use of transaction prices. This implicitly assumes an equal 
probability of a trade occurring at the ask or at the bid price.  If this is not the case, block 
trade price effects will be systematically biased.  There is significant evidence that prices 
at the open and close of trade have a tendency to occur at the ask (Harris, 1989, Porter, 
1992 and Aitken et al, 1995).  
 
In order to explore whether the asymmetry between block buys and block sells is due 
to the tendency to trade at the ask price, we test for the impact of bid-ask bias by 
computing returns which are purged of bid-ask effects. 
 
The propensity to trade at the quotes is examined by documenting the frequency of 
trades at the bid and the ask price. The frequency of trades occurring at the ask and at the 
bid price are computed with the use of the order flow ratio. The order flow ratio is 
calculated for the open and closing price on block trading days, as follows: 
()
()
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  6As the order flow ratio approaches 1 the more likely the trade price is at the bid price, 
while the closer the ratio is to zero the greater the likelihood the trade is at the ask (Lease 
et al, 1991). 
 
The implementation of quote returns as suggested by Lease et al (1991) will diminish 
the effects of systematic order flow imbalances biasing transaction prices. To eliminate 
transaction returns of bid-ask bounce quote return measures are devised.  Engle and 
Patton (2000) discover an asymmetry in the impact of buyer or seller initiated 
transactions on market quotes.  They argue that purchases exhibit a greater impact on the 
ask side of the market, while the bid price leads the ask price following sales.  In order to 
incorporate this, seller initiated block trade price effects are calculated using bid prices, 
while block purchase price effects are examined with the use of ask quotes.   
 
Quote effects, identified as bid-trade-bid/ask-trade-ask replace   in equations 2 and 
3 with the opening bid/ask quote and   in equations 1 and 2 with the closing bid/ask 
price, while maintaining   as the block trade price, in order to ascertain how much of 





5. Empirical  Results 
5.1  Propensity to Trade at the Ask Quotes 
 
Table 3 evaluates the percentage of opening and closing transactions at the ask 
quote on block trading days for the largest 100 stocks on the LSE.   Clearly there is a 
tendency for both the opening and closing prices to be at the ask.  Consistent with Porter 
(1992) and Frino et al (2003) we find a significant difference between the relative 
  7frequencies that trade commences and ceases at the bid and ask quotes. On block trading 
days, 30 percent of closing prices are at the ask quote, while only 26 percent are at the bid 
price, a similar story is depicted for the opening price with 15.23 percent of trades at the 
ask and only 10.23 percent at the bid.  Tests of equal proportions of trades occurring at 
the bid and the ask price based on chi-square tests show a significant difference for both 
the opening and closing price. The mean order flow ratio also supports contentions that 
the opening and closing transactions have a propensity to execute at the ask price.    
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
5.2  Price Impacts of Block Trades Purged of Bid-Ask Bias 
The significance of the propensity for the open and closing price to be at the ask quotes is 
measured by changes in price effects using bid and ask quotes.  Mean returns purged of 
bid-ask bias in table 4 portray a different impression of a block trade then those provided 
in table 2. Turning firstly to ask-trade-ask returns, purchases are associated with a 
significant total price effect of 16.63 basis points. Analogous to the continuation 
following purchase, block sales are associated with a total price decline of 11.03 basis 
points. Table 4 implies that bid-ask bias is a possible explanation for the directional 
asymmetry in return between buyer and seller initiated block trades.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
5.3  Price Impacts of Matched Block Trades 
An advantage of matching techniques is that no functional form is imposed to control for 
differences in transactions. This is of particular interest to block trade price effects in the 
LSE as Gemmill (1996) discovers a non-linear relationship between trade size and price 
revisions. Block purchase and sales are as closely matched as possible. Matches have 
  8been selected on a minute by minute and week by week sequential search before and after 
the block trade such that pairs are not selected on the same day and do not exceed a one-
year event window (Choe et al, 1995 and Frino et al, 2003).
5 
 
  An issue that arises with matching is whether pairs are selected with or without 
replacement. Sampling with replacement results in two independent samples, unlike 
samples selected without replacement, where the extent of covariance between samples 
depends on population size. If the population is very large the covariance is close to zero, 
such that the sampling with or without replacement is almost identical. Given the large 
number of possible matches available, pairs are selected with replacement.
6 Once trades 
were matched the dataset consisted of 924,344 block buys and sells. The matched trades 
are relatively smaller then the unmatched trades, reflecting on the impact of the strict 
matching procedure.  
 
We witness from table 5 that the results obtained from table 4 are strongly reflected in the 
analysis on matched block trades. The asymmetry of the price impacts associated with 
buyer and seller initiated trades is significantly reduced once the bid-ask bias has been 
eliminated. This demonstrates the effect of controlling for the market environment and 
systematic differences between block purchases and sales.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
                                                 
5  If block purchases and sales were matched on the same day differences between permanent price effects 
would be downwardly biased, falsely accepting tests of equality between buy and sell information effects.  
6  We also conducted the analysis using sampling without replacement. The results (not reported) are 
almost identical to the results with replacement.  
  96.   Robustness Tests  
  
Several robustness tests are carried out to examine the persistence of the results from 
the previous sections.  Firstly, results are analysed across block trade sizes, Secondly, 
results are computed on year-by-year basis.   
 
Separating block trades into categories of 10,000 to 20,000, 20,000 to 50,000 and greater 
than 50,000, following Madhavan and Cheng (1997), the asymmetry documented in table 
2 for trade price effects is observed consistently. Once quote returns are substituted for 
transaction prices, the asymmetric price response between purchases and sales is 
eliminated.  Across the seven years examined, the asymmetry is observed for five years, 
and insignificant in 2000 and 2001.  This reinforces our contention that it is the 
propensity to trade at the ask during the open and close of trade on the LSE that results in 
an anomaly in the empirical block trading literature.   
 
7.   Conclusion 
 
Gemmill (1996) established that an asymmetry exists in the price behaviour 
surrounding buyer and seller initiated trades on the LSE. However, the biases introduced 
through the existence of the bid-ask spread were ignored in his study.  
 
   In this paper we observe that, estimating block price effects using quote returns to 
eliminate bid-ask bounce in transaction price returns, produces symmetrical behaviour in 
price effects surrounding block trades.  A significant positive price reaction followed by a 
continuation is reported for purchases, and a significant negative price reaction followed 
by a permanent price fall for sales. The results are robust across trade sizes and trading 
  10years. Our empirical results suggest market liquidity is one of the factors that is driving 
the asymmetry between block purchases and sales in the LSE.  
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  13 
TABLE 1 Summary Statistics of Block Purchases and Sales for the FTSE 100 over 
the time period January 1998 to January 2004.  
 
Table 1 reports the number of observations, the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation 
for block trade size.  The sample consists of all LSE trades in the largest 100 companies stocks of 10,000 or 




  Number of 
observations 
Mean Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
deviation 
Block Buys  1,613,766  22,125  16,000  10,000  10,300,000  18,900.44 




  14TABLE 2 Transaction Price Effects of Block Trades 
 
Table 2 reports transaction returns surrounding block trades of 10,000 shares or more executed on the 100 
largest stocks on the LSE for the time period January 1, 1998 to January 1, 2004, broken down by buyer 
(Panel A) and seller (Panel B) initiated trades.  Three measures of price impact are reported:  
(1) Temporary, defined as the logarithmic return from the block price to the block price after the execution 
of a block trade; (2) Permanent, defined as the logarithmic return from the block price after the execution of 
a block trade to the equilibrium price prior to the block transaction; and (3) Total, defined as the 
logarithmic return from the block price to the equilibrium price prior to the block transaction.   
 
  
Panel A Buys (n = 1,613,766) 
  Trade Returns 
  Temporary Permanent  Total 
Mean 3.56  31.62  32.66 
Standard Deviation  157.63  224.76  182.79 
t-statistic 17.72*  29.43*  46.32* 
     
Panel B Sells (n= 1,226,599) 
  Trade Returns 
  Temporary Permanent  Total 
Mean -1.04  -26.72  -23.16 
Standard Deviation  145.31  222.85  186.89 
t-statistic -8.23*  -99.37*  -94.87* 
    
*  Significant at the 95% level 
  
  15TABLE 3 Prices Relative to Bids and Asks on Block Trading Days 
Table 3 reports the distribution of opening and closing prices at the quotes on block trading days.  Panel A 
provides the relative frequencies across the two categories of trade position relative to quotes in addition to 
order flow ratios. Panel B provides chi-square tests of equality for the position of opening and closing 
transaction across the two categories (Equality across all categories); across the cumulative frequency of 
trades being close to the bid or ask, given by the sum of relative frequencies at the bid and the ask price.  
 
 
Panel A Distribution of Open and Closing Prices 
Trade At Ask At Bid Mean  
Order Flow 
Ratio  
Open 15.23  10.23 0.4575 
Close 29.76  26.12 0.4876 
 
Panel B Tests of Percentages of Prices by Bid-Ask Position 
    
Open Price  Equality at bid and ask χ
2 =603* 
Close Price  Equality at bid and ask χ
2 = 102* 
 




  16TABLE 4 Quote Price Effects of Block Trades 
 
Table 4 reports mean returns purged of bid-ask bias surrounding block trades of 10,000 shares or more 
executed on the 100 largest stocks on the LSE for the time period January 1, 1998 to January 1, 2004, 
broken down by buyer (Panel A) and seller (Panel B) initiated trades. Three measures of price impact are 
reported: (1) Temporary, defined as the logarithmic return from the block price to the block price after the 
execution of a block trade; (2) Permanent, defined as the logarithmic return from the block price after the 
execution of a block trade to the equilibrium price prior to the block transaction; and (3) Total, defined as 
the logarithmic return from the block price to the equilibrium price prior to the block transaction.    
 
 
Panel A Buys (n = 1,613,766) 
  Ask-Trade-Ask Returns 
  Temporary Permanent  Total 
Mean  12.23 23.26 16.63 
Standard Deviation  154.49  216.93  187.63 
t-statistic  99.59* 119.72* 48.86* 
    
Panel B Sells (n= 1,226,599) 
 Bid-Trade-Bid  Returns 
 Temporary  Permanent  Total 
     
Mean  -10.74 -27.37 -11.03 
Standard Deviation  149.15  179.12  167.96 
t-statistic  -72.84* -102.45* -45.29* 
    
 
* Significant at the 95% level  
 
  17TABLE 5 Quote Price Effects of Matched Block Trades 
 
Table 5 reports transaction returns surrounding block trades of 10,000 shares or more executed on the 100 
largest stocks on the LSE for the period January 1, 1998 to January 1, 2004, broken down by buyer (Panel 
A) and seller (Panel B) initiated trades, based on matching purchases with replacement to sales on size, 
stock, time of day and weekday. Three measures of price impact are reported: (1) Temporary, defined as 
the logarithmic return from the block price to the block price after the execution of a block trade; (2) 
Permanent, defined as the logarithmic return from the block price after the execution of a block trade to the 
equilibrium price prior to the block transaction; and (3) Total, defined as the logarithmic return from the 
block price to the equilibrium price prior to the block transaction.   
  
 
Panel A Buys (n = 924,344) 
  Ask-Trade-Ask Returns 
  Temporary Permanent  Total 
Mean  11.63 21.19 10.96 
Standard Deviation  149.51  204.17  177.23 
t-statistic -96.32*  102.16*  65.32* 
    
Panel B Sells (n= 924,344) 
 Bid-Trade-Bid  Returns 
 Temporary  Permanent  Total 
     
Mean -10.74  -21.94  -9.21 
Standard Deviation  132.13  182.32  169.84 
t-statistic  -69.81* -102.49* -69.45* 
    
 
* Significant at the 95% level  
  
  18